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BUSINESS LAW
I. EVEN THOUGH PARTNERS DID NOT CREATE AN EXPRESS
AGREEMENT, A PARTNERSHIP WILL NOT BE AT WILL IF EVIDENCE
EXISTS THAT THE PARTNERS ENVISIONED A DEFINITE TERM OR
UNDERTAKING
In Beck v. Clarkson1 the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that (1) even though the partners did not create an express agreement,
the partnership may not be at will if the partners envisioned the ac-
complishment of a definite term or undertaking, and (2) a partner con-
tinues to owe a fiduciary duty to other partners even after the dissolu-
tion of the partnership. In Beck the court of appeals sent to a jury the
question whether a partner should be awarded a share of the partner-
ship's anticipated profits even though the partners did not create a
partnership agreement and the partner's role in the business ended
before the partnership acquired assets or transacted business.2
In January 1985 Beck agreed to form a partnership with the de-
fendant Clarkson and a third party. The group formed the partnership
to build and develop a warehouse facility and to lease the warehouse to
Spring City Knitting Company (Spring City), a division of Cluett,
Peabody Company (Cluett). Beck's wife assisted Clarkson in research-
ing a proposal that they submitted to Cluett, but in July 1985 Clarkson
told Beck that he would not be included in Clarkson's further negotia-
tions with Cluett. Between July and September 1985 Clarkson formed
another partnership with her family, and in September the new part-
1. 300 S.C. 293, 387 S.E.2d 681 (Ct. App. 1989).
2. Id. at 295-96, 387 S.E.2d at 682-83.
1
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nership contracted to purchase the land for the Spring City warehouse
facility. Clarkson built the warehouse facility, and in January 1986 she
leased the facility to Spring City. Beck sued Clarkson for future
damages.
3
The trial court granted a directed verdict for the defendant on the
grounds that Beck failed to prove (1) that a partnership existed, (2)
that Clarkson was liable for damages because any partnership formed
was a partnership at will, and the partners dissolved the partnership
before they owned property or transacted business, and (3) that the
damages Beck sought were not reasonably certain. The court of ap-
peals, however, reversed the trial court and remanded the case for a
new trial.
4
First, the court of appeals entertained the question whether a
partnership existed between the parties. Both parties agreed that they
did not form an express verbal or written agreement. 5 Thus, the test
used by the court to determine the existence of a partnership is found
in the Uniform Partnership Act (U.P.A.), which the South Carolina
Legislature adopted in 1950.6 South Carolina Code section 33-41-210
states, "A partnership is an association of two or more persons to carry
on as co-owners a business for profit."'2 The court also added that "[a]
partnership agreement may rest in parol. The agreement may even be
implied and without express intention.""
In Beck the court of appeals instructed the reader to study care-
fully the language of Stephens v. Stephens9 when considering the exis-
tence of a partnership.10 In Stephens the South Carolina Supreme
Court held that "[o]ne of the most important tests as to the existence
of a partnership is the intention of the parties.""" The court also found,
however, that "when all of the conditions exist which by law create a
legal relationship, the effects flowing legally from such relation follow
whether the parties foresaw and intended them or not. ' 12 The supreme
court decided Stephens before South Carolina adopted the Uniform
Partnership Act, but the South Carolina Code has incorporated the
3. Id. at 295-97, 387 S.E.2d at 682-83.
4. Id. at 297, 387 S.E.2d at 683.
5. Id. at 300, 387 S.E.2d at 685.
6. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-41-10 to -1090 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
7. Id. § 33-41-210.
8. Beck, 300 S.C. at 301, 387 S.E.2d at 685 (quoting Wyman v. Davis, 223 S.C.
172, 74 S.E.2d 694 (1953)); see also Buffkin v. Strickland, 280 S.C. 343, 312 S.E.2d 579
(Ct. App. 1984).
9. 213 S.C. 525, 50 S.E.2d 577 (1948).
10. 300 S.C. at 301, 387 S.E.2d at 685.
11. 213 S.C. at 530, 50 S.E.2d at 579.
12. Id. at 531, 50 S.E.2d at 579.
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idea that parties can create a partnership without express intention. 3
The Stephens court held that when partners do not form a partnership
by agreement, a partnership is formed if the parties have an equal
right to control the management of the business and if the parties are
sharing profits and losses. 4 In Beck the court held that the parties
displayed the necessary intent to send the question to a jury whether
the parties formed a partnership. The court found the following evi-
dence persuasive: (1) Beck testified that the parties agreed to share
profits and losses; (2) Beck's wife had procured plats and contacted the
owners of all the property that surrounded Spring City's plant; and (3)
the letterhead on certain documents listed Beck as a partner. 5
Once the court of appeals decided that a partnership might exist,
it focused on whether the breaching party could be liable for damages,
and in doing so, entertained whether the parties had dissolved the
partnership. In McPherson v. J.E. Sirrine & Co.' 6 the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that when a partnership agreement does not fix
any definite time for the termination of the partnership, the partner-
ship is a partnership at will, subject to dissolution by any partner at
any time.17 Clarkson argued that because the parties did not fix any
definite time for terminating the partnership, the partnership was at
will and, thus, Clarkson dissolved the old partnership when she formed
the new partnership. She thought that she no longer owed any duty to
Beck.'8 In Beck, however, the court of appeals stated that the McPher-
son rule should be construed broadly. The court ruled that even
though Beck and Clarkson did not expressly agree to the termination
date of the partnership, the parties envisioned the accomplishment of a
definite undertaking, namely the building and leasing of a warehouse
to Spring City contingent only upon the decision of Spring City to do
business with the partnership. 9 The court remanded the case for a
13. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-210 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
14. 213 S.C. at 532, 50 S.E.2d at 580.
15. Beck, 300 S.C. at 300-01, 387 S.E.2d at 685.
16. 206 S.C. 183, 33 S.E.2d 501 (1945).
17. Id. at 207, 33 S.E.2d at 511.
18. Beck, 300 S.C. at 303, 387 S.E.2d at 686; see also Weeks v. McMUllan, 291 S.C.
287, 353 S.E.2d 289 (Ct. App. 1987) (withdrawal of two lartners and the admission of
two new partners created an ipso facto dissolution of the original partnership).
19. Beck, 300 S.C. at 302, 387 S.E.2d at 686. The court adopted the rule set forth in
AM. JuR. 2D:
If a partnership is one at will, without any definite term or definite undertak-
ing to be accomplished, a dissolution by the election of one party is not a
breach of contract, so that the terminating party incurs no liability, whatever
the motive for the termination may have been, and whatever may be the inju-
rious consequences to his copartners who have neglected to protect themselves
by an agreement to continue for a definite term.
1990]
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jury trial to determine whether the parties envisioned a definite under-
taking. If they did, the court would find that the parties had agreed to
a definite term, the agreement would not be at will, and the breaching
party would not be immune from liability.20
The court of appeals is breaking new ground with this point. Most
parties that enter into a partnership arrangement have envisioned
some definite undertaking to be accomplished. By adopting the lan-
guage from American Jurisprudence, the court of appeals has made it
very difficult for partners to exist in an at-will relationship. The U.P.A.
governs partnership relationships in the absence of any agreement.
South Carolina Code section 33-41-91021 states that "dissolution of a
partnership is the change in the relation of the partners caused by any
partner ceasing to be associated in the carrying on ...of the busi-
ness" and section 33-41-930(1)(b)22 states that dissolution is caused
"by the express will of any partner when no definite term or particular
undertaking is specified." The U.P.A. only carves out the "definite un-
dertaking" exception when the undertaking is specified in an agree-
ment23 The court of appeals construes the language of the U.P.A. very
broadly when it holds that if the parties envision a definite undertak-
ing, the partnership will not be at will regardless of whether the parties
entered into an agreement.
Moreover, the court of appeals noted that even if the partnership
had been at will and, therefore, dissolved when Clarkson left the part-
nership, Beck could still recover from Clarkson because Clarkson may
have breached the fiduciary duty she owed to Beck as a partner.2 The
Beck court held that the U.P.A. "makes it clear that an act of dissolu-
tion does not terminate the partnership. It is equally clear that dissolu-
tion does not extinguish the partner's fiduciary duties owed one to the
other. '25 The court held that Clarkson may have violated her fiduciary
duty to Beck because she may have breached a duty not to compete
Id. (quoting 59A Am. Jun. 2D Partnership § 819 (1987) (emphasis added)).
20. Id.
21. S.C. CoDE ANN. § 33-41-910 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
22. Id. § 33-41-930(1)(b).
23. Id.
24. Beck, 300 S.C. at 304, 387 S.E.2d at 687.
25. Id. at 303, 387 S.E.2d at 686. South Carolina Code section 33-41-540(1) states
that "[elvery partner must account to the partnership for any benefit and hold as trustee
for it any profits derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any
transaction connected with the formation, conduct or liquidation of the partnership or
from any use by him of its property." S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-41-540 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
See also Few v. Few, 239 S.C. 321, 122 S.E.2d 829 (1961) (partners are treated as fiducia-
ries to each other; their relationship is one of mutual trust and confidence, imposing
upon them the usual trust requirements of loyalty, good faith, and fair dealing).
[Vol. 42
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with the partnership." Clarkson's withdrawal also might have consti-
tuted a breach of contract by wrongful dissolution. Thus, regardless
of whether the partnership was at will, Clarkson could be liable to
Beck for a breach of fiduciary duty.
2
Finally, the court turned its attention to whether Beck's claim for
damages was too speculative to allow the case to go to a jury.2 9 The
trial court determined that Beck's claim for damages was too specula-
tive because lost profits from a new business are per se nonrecover-
able.3 0 In Drews Co. v. Ledwith-Wolfe Associates3 1 the South Carolina
Supreme Court held that South Carolina should "unequivocally join
those jurisdictions applying the new business rule as a rule of eviden-
tiary sufficiency and not as an automatic preclusion to recovery of lost
profits by a new business or enterprise. ' 32 The Beck court, therefore,
followed recent South Carolina precedent and reversed the trial court
on the question of evidentiary sufficiency.
In Drews the court set forth the following three requirements to
determine lost profits: (1) the lost profits must be a natural conse-
quence of the breach; (2) the lost profits must be foreseeable; and (3)
the aggrieved party must establish the lost profits with reasonable cer-
tainty, not conjecture or speculation.3 To determine what constitutes
reasonable certainty, the South Carolina Supreme Court in South Car-
olina Finance Corp. of Anderson v. West Side Finance Co.3' held that
"[t]he law does not require absolute certainty of data upon which lost
profits are to be estimated . . . and it is sufficient if there is a certain
standard or fixed method by which profits sought to be recovered may
be estimated and determined with a fair degree of accuracy."3 The
Beck court wrote that "[iun the case of a partner wrongfully excluded
from the business, resulting in a dissolution of the partnership as to
him, his entitlement is to his share of the profits on the completion of
the venture . ". .. ,3 Beck, therefore, might be entitled to a substantial
share of the profits even though he contributed nothing to the business
after the first six months of the partnership. Although this may not
26. Beck, 300 S.C. at 304, 387 S.E.2d at 687.
27. Id.
28. Id.
29. See id. at 297-300, 387 S.E.2d at 683-86.
30. Id. at 297, 387 S.E.2d at 683 (citing Standard Supply Co. v. Carter & Harris, 81
S.C. 181, 62 S.E. 150 (1907)).
31. 296 S.C. 207, 371 S.E.2d 532 (1988).
32. Id. at 212, 371 S.E.2d at 535.
33. Id. at 213, 371 S.E.2d at 535-36.
34. 236 S.C. 109, 113 S.E.2d 329 (1960).
35. Id. at 122-23, 113 S.E.2d at 336 (citations omitted).
36. Beck, 300 S.C. at 299, 387 S.E.2d at 684 (quoting 59A A. JuL. 2D Partnership
§ 566 (1987)).
19.90]
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seem equitable, the court is sending a message to the business commu-
nity: do not breach your duty of loyalty to your partner.37
The South Carolina Court of Appeals has broken new ground with
its decision in Beck. It has made it very difficult for parties to enter
into an at-will partnership even in the absence of an agreement. Thus,
the lesson of Beck is that it is never too early in a business relationship
to enter into a written agreement which will define the rights and du-
ties of the parties. The written agreement helps parties to avoid dis-
putes, establish proof of the relationship, and avoid litigation. The lack
of a written agreement may give a court and a jury the opportunity to
speculate later about the parties' intentions.
Matthew J. Norton
II. MAJORITY SHAREHOLDERS GENERALLY OWE No DUTY TO MINORITY
SHAREHOLDERS FOR A PREMIUM THEY RECEIVE ON SALE OF STOCK
In Shoaf v. Warlick3U the South Carolina Court of Appeals held
that majority shareholders generally do not owe a duty to minority
shareholders to refuse, or to share, the premium paid for their control-
ling block of stock."
The case arose from the sale of the controlling shares of the Coca-
Cola Bottling Company of Anderson (Coke-Anderson) to the Coca-
Cola Bottling Company of Asheville (Coke-Asheville). Coke-Asheville
approached Paul W. Warlick, Jr., Coke-Anderson's chief executive of-
ficer and controlling shareholder, with an offer to purchase his control-
ling shares. Mr. Warlick did not negotiate the $4,000,000 offer for his
shares. He did, however, negotiate the offer for the minority shares
from an initial offer of $11,000 per share to the actual price of $14,000
per share. Coke-Asheville informed the minority shareholders of the
proposed sale about a month before Mr. Warlick granted an option to
Coke-Asheville for his shares. A few months later, the plaintiffs, Wayne
H. Shoaf and Perry L. Jones, accepted an offer from Coke-Asheville of
$14,000 per share for their holdings. The plaintiffs alleged that Warlick
breached a fiduciary duty and took an improper premium for his
shares. The trial court found that Warlick breached no fiduciary duty
and granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant. 0
South Carolina courts traditionally considered stock to be personal
37. See S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-41-530 to -540 (Law. Co-op. 1990) (partners' duty to
disclose information and duty as a fiduciary).
38. 298 S.C. 415, 380 S.E.2d 865 (Ct. App. 1989).
39. Id. at 418-19, 380 S.E.2d at 866-67.
40. Id. at 416-18, 380 S.E.2d at 865-66.
[Vol. 42
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property.41 The courts have been hesitant to dictate how shareholders
may dispose of their property. The Shoaf court recognized that the
South Carolina Supreme Court regards stock as personal property and
repeatedly has adhered to this rule.4 2 The court held that a shareholder
is not required to share part of the price he receives for his stock with
other shareholders. 3
The Shoaf decision follows the majority rule on this question."
Apparently, no jurisdiction holds that majority shareholders have a
duty to refuse a premium on the sale of their stock. Many early writers
argued that premiums for sale of control were improper and the seller
should not retain them. 5 Recently, however, writers have argued that
premiums are acceptable and even beneficial.4s Throughout the debate,
courts have generally retained the rule that a majority shareholder may
sell his shares at the highest price he can obtain and is not under a
duty to share the premium he receives with minority shareholders.
47
This is true even when the shareholder is an officer or director.48
Although the courts have not recognized a duty to refrain from
taking a premium, some exceptions exist.4 Minority shareholders can
look to these exceptions for relief in certain circumstances, and major-
ity shareholders should be cautious about them.
South Carolina controlling shareholders could be liable for a pre-
mium when the purchaser of the controlling shares loots the assets of
the corporation after the sale. Looting occurs when the buyer of the
41. See, e.g., McLeod v. Sandy Island Corp., 265 S.C. 1, 7, 216 S.E.2d 746, 748
(1975); Alderman v. Alderman, 178 S.C. 9, 43, 181 S.E. 897, 911 (1935).
42. 298 S.C. at 418, 380 S.E.2d at 866.
43. Id. (quoting Swinney v. Keebler Co., 480 F.2d 573, 577 (4th Cir. 1973)). The
Shoaf court stated that "stockholders must 'necessarily act for themselves, and not as
trustees for other stockholders.'" Id.
44. See, e.g., McDaniel v. Painter, 418 F.2d 545 (10th Cir. 1969); Ruby v. Dunnett,
88 F.2d 68 (10th Cir. 1937), cert. denied, 301 U.S. 706 (1937); Benton v. United States,
114 F. Supp. 37 (M.D. Ga. 1953); Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr.
781 (1969); Bart v. Pine Grove, Inc., 326 IMI. App. 426, 62 N.E.2d 127 (1945); Nelson v.
Northland Life Ins. Co., 197 Minn. 151, 266 N.W. 857 (1936); Levy v. American Beverage
Corp., 265 A.D. 208, 38 N.Y.S.2d 517 (App. Div. 1942); Tryon v. Smith, 191 Or. 172, 229
P.2d 251 (1951); Thompson v. Hambrick, 508 S.W.2d 949 (Tex. Ct. App. 1974).
45. See, e.g., Berle, The Price of Power: Sale of Corporate Control, 50 CORNELL
L.Q. 628, 629 (1965).
46. See, e.g., Hill, The Sale of Controlling Shares, 70 HARv. L. REV. 986 (1977).
47. See O'Neal, Symposium: Sale of Control-Introduction, 4 J. CORP. L. 239, 239
(1979). "With only frequent and relatively minor exceptions, the courts still adhere to
the traditional view that a shareholder ... may sell his shares ... for whatever price he
can obtain, even if his shares constitute a controlling block and the price per share is
enhanced by that fact." Id.
48. Id.
49. See infra notes 51, 56, 59, 62 and accompanying text.
1990]
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controlling shares improperly converts the assets of the corporation for
his personal use to the detriment of the minority, shareholders or credi-
tors . 0 South Carolina courts would probably adopt the Fourth Cir-
cuit's view that the seller of controlling shares may have a duty to
investigate.
In Swinney v. Keebler51 the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held
that if the circumstances of the offer would cause a prudent person to
believe looting could occur, the controlling shareholder has an affirma-
tive duty to conduct a reasonable investigation to determine whether
looting is likely to occur.5 2 Factors which give rise to a duty to investi-
gate include bad credit reports, unsatisfied judgments, an inflated
price, and indications that the purchaser wants control of liquid assets
as soon as possible.53 When the buyer appears reputable and financial
statements indicate an ability to purchase the corporation without re-
sort to looting, the seller does not have a duty to investigate. 4 When
the seller of control shares does not fulfill the duty to investigate and
looting occurs, however, the seller is liable.5
Another limitation on the general rule that would probably apply
in South Carolina affects shareholders when the sale is really a sale of
the corporate management. This arises when the purchase of the stock
is secondary to securing a management position of officer or director.56
Although this exception appears broad because the sale of a controlling
block of stock usually passes the ability to assume a management posi-
tion, its application is quite limited. Courts have recognized this limi-
tation only when the percentage of shares purchased is very low, less
than 10 percent, and a portion of the purchase price is specifically allo-
cated to managerial control.5 7 A sale of corporate management is im-
proper because it is essentially the buying of corporate offices.. A
purchase of this type is improper, whether it is made directly or dis-
guised by the purchase of a nominal amount of shares.58
50. See Hayes, Sale of Control of a Corporation: Who Gets the Premium, 4 J.
CORP. L. 243, 243 (1979).
51. 480 F.2d 573 (4th Cir. 1973).
52. Id. at 577-78.
53. See id.
54. Id. at 575.
55. See Hayes, Sale of Control of a Corporation: Who Gets the Premium, 4 J.
CoRP. L. 243, 251 (1979).
56. See id. at 248-50.
57. See, e.g., Nelson v. Gammon, 478 F. Supp. 630, 634-37 (W.D. Ky. 1979), aff'd,
647 F.2d 710 (6th Cir. 1981). See generally 12B W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS § 5805.20, at 143 (rev. perm. ed. 1980) (this exception arises when
it is possible to acquire managerial control by purchasing a small percentage of the
stock).
58. See Hayes, Sale of Control of a Corporation: Who Gets the Premium, 4 J.
[Vol. 42
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The South Carolina Supreme Court has not indicated whether it
would recognize this limitation. The Shoaf court, however, noted with
approval a decision of the Florida Court of Appeals which holds that
parties cannot sever and sell the management control of a corporation
separately from the voting stock representing this control.59
South Carolina courts probably would follow the widely recognized
limitation that a majority shareholder is liable for the premium he re-
ceives when he, in effect, sells a corporate asset that belongs to all
shareholders. Perlman v. Feldmann0 involved this type of sale. In
Perlman a group of steel customers purchased a steel manufacturer for
a premium in order to secure a source of steel in a tight market.6' Be-
cause the customers of the manufacturer now owned the manufacturer,
the manufacturer could not charge higher prices on the open market.
In these circumstances, the buyer is not paying a premium for a con-
trolling interest in the corporation. Instead, he is purchasing an asset
of the corporation: the output of the manufacturer at below-market
prices. These assets belong to all shareholders. This type of sale results
in lost profits to the corporation and, therefore, injures the minority
shareholders. This situation is not a true exception to the general rule
because the buyer is not really paying the premium for the controlling
block of shares.
Some courts apparently recognize that the seller may have a fidu-
ciary duty to the minority shareholders to make reasonable efforts on
their behalf and to inform them of the transaction. 2 These decisions,
however, are infrequent, and usually occur when the seller abuses his
advantage.6 3 The court of appeals apparently rejected this type of com-
mon law duty in Shoaf. The court quoted from Martin v. Marlin:4
CORP. L. 243, 249 (1979) (in its most blatant form, the surrender of executive or board of
director positions is made part of the deal and is, in fact, what the deal is all about).
59. Shoaf v. Warlick, 298 S.C. 415, 418-19, 380 S.E.2d 865, 866-67 (Ct. App. 1989)
(citing Martin v. Marlin, 529 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), reh'g denied, 539 So. 2d
475 (Fla. 1988)). Part of the Martin opinion that is not quoted in Shoaf states that there
are "well-established principles of equity that a corporate officer or director may not sell
such office for personal gain [but that this rule] is limited to situations where the sale of
the corporate office is 'by itself (i.e., unaccompanied by sufficient stock to carry voting
control).'" Id. (emphasis added).
60. 219 F.2d 173 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 952 (1955).
61. Id. at 175.
62. Brown v. Halbert, 271 Cal. App. 2d 252, 76 Cal. Rptr. 781 (1969) (a majority
shareholder-director case).
63. See, e.g., Joiies v. H.F. Ahmanson & Co., 1 Cal. 3d 93, 460 P.2d 464, 81 Cal.
Rptr. 592 (1969) (majority shareholders created a market for their block of stock while
excluding the other shareholders and, thus, rendered the majority shareholders' stock
much less valuable).
64. 529 So. 2d 1174 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), reh'g denied, 539 So. 2d 475 (Fla. 1988).
1990]
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[T]he courts generally hold that neither the selling shareholder nor
his purchaser is under an obligation to see that other shareholders are
provided opportunities to sell their shares on the same favorable
terms as the controlling shareholder or even to inform minority share-
holders of the sale of the controlling interest.
6 5
Although the Shoaf court seems to reject this exception, it could follow
the lead of other courts and allow an action like fraud when the major-
ity shareholder is particularly abusive.68 The majority shareholder in
Shoaf did not abuse his position. The court, therefore, wisely left open
the option to use exceptions to deal with situations in which the major-
ity shareholder is not so benign. The Shoaf decision not only follows
case law, but also seems empirically and economically correct. A rule
that makes receiving a premium for controlling shares improper would
drastically change the long-established method of selling controlling
blocks of stock. In addition, the controlling block of stock is a different
commodity than other shares. It carries the right of control. It seems
equitable to require and receive a higher price for the right to control
the business. Finally, requiring buyers to pay a premium to all share-
holders will either increase the cost to them or will lower the price paid
to the majority shareholder. This result will decrease the number of
controlling share sales and thereby discourage economic efficiencies
that arise from placing assets in the hands of those who value them
most and feel they can better maximize the economic benefit of the
assets.
The Shoaf court expressly held that majority shareholders in
South Carolina do not have a duty to refrain from taking a premium
on their stock. Minority shareholders have no right to share this pre-
mium or even to be informed of the majority shareholder's offer.67 The
majority shareholder's right to receive a premium, however, probably
does not allow him to, in effect, sell a corporate asset or, office, nor to
defraud the corporation or the minority shareholders. If the premium
is truly given in exchange for the controlling shares, it seems
appropriate.
The Shoaf court based this decision on a well-established rule.
The decision also is consistent with the traditional rules governing
stock sales in South Carolina.
Charles F. Thompson, Jr.
65. Shoaf v. Warlick, 298 S.C. 415, 419, 380 S.E.2d 865, 867 (Ct. App. 1989) (quot-
ing Martin, 529 So. 2d at 1177).
66. Hamilton, Private Sale of Control Transactions: Where We Stand Today, 29
CORP. PRAC. COMMENTATOR 1, 33-34 (1987).
67. 298 S.C. at 420, 380 S.E.2d at 867.
[V61. 42
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III. FORMER SHAREHOLDER LACKS STANDING TO MIAINTAIN DIRECT
ACTION AGAINST PRESIDENT FOR BREACH OF DuTY OWED TO
CORPORATION
In Davis v. Hamm"s the South Carolina Court of Appeals held that
a former shareholder cannot bring a direct action against a corporate
director for misappropriation of corporate assets and breach of fiduci-
ary duty. 9 The court, however, recognized that an officer or director's
failure to make a full disclosure of all relevant facts, when purchasing
shares of stock from a stockholder, will result in a viable cause of ac-
tion for the shareholder against the officer or director.70
In Davis the corporation, TICOA Investments, Inc. (TICOA), had
five shareholders. The plaintiff, Davis, was a former shareholder. The
defendant Hamm had been both the president and a director of the
corporation. The corporation entered into a lease agreement for the
lease of a computer. Hamm personally guaranteed the lease. The cor-
poration missed several lease payments, however, and the bank de-
manded the return of the computer. Hamm removed the computer
from the corporation's place of business, had it refinanced in his own
name, and informed the corporation that he intended to hold the com-
puter until the corporation relieved him of his personal obligation to
the bank. Davis alleged the defendant breached his fiduciary duty,
mismanaged the corporate assets, and that this action caused the value
of TICOA stock to decrease. Davis sold his stock at a decreased value
and later brought this action for damages. 1
A general rule in corporate law provides:
A stockholder may individually sue corporate directors, officers, or
other persons when he has sustained a loss separate and distinct from
that of other stockholders generally. However, an individual has no
right to bring an action in his own name and in his own behalf for a
wrong committed solely against the corporation."
68. 300 S.C. 284, 387 S.E.2d 676 (Ct. App. 1989).
69. Id. at 288, 387 S.E.2d at 678.
70. Id. at 289, 387 S.E.2d at 679. In Jacobson v Yaschik, 249 S.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d
601 (1967), one shareholder, the president of the corporation, entered into a contract to
sell all of the capital stock in the corporation to a third party. At the same time the
president bought the corporation's only other shareholder's stock at a lower price. The
president failed to disclose the contract to sell all of the capital stock to a third party to
the other shareholder before he bought the stock. The South Carolina Supreme Court
held that the officer breached a fiduciary duty when he withheld relevant information
when he bought the shareholder's stock, and the court allowed the former shareholder to
maintain a cause of action against the officer. Id. at 585-86, 155 S.E.2d at 606.
71. Davis, 300 S.C. at 286, 387 S.E.2d at 677.
72. Ward v. Griffin, 295 S.C. 219, 221, 367 S.E.2d 703, 704 (Ct. App. 1988) (quoting
19 Axl. Jun. 2D Corporations § 2245, at 147 (1986)). See Strickland v. Flue-Cured To-
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Courts generally hold that a director's breach of a fiduciary duty to the
corporation or mismanagement of corporate assets is a wrong to the
corporation and gives rise to actions by or on behalf of the corpora-
tion.73 These courts do not allow direct actions by individual stock-
holders because this would open the door for voluminous litigation,
benefit one shareholder at the expense of others, and ignore the corpo-
rate entity.7 4 In South Carolina, however, a director has the express
duty to act "in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best inter-
ests of the corporation and its shareholders."7 5 Unlike the drafters of
the Model Act,76 however, the South Carolina Legislature specifically
retained the language "and its shareholders." According to the South
Carolina reporters' comments to section 33-8-300, shareholders are ex-
press statutory beneficiaries of fiduciary duties owed by corporate in-
siders.77 The purpose of including shareholders in the South Carolina
Act was "to make clear that the fiduciary duty of directors runs to the
shareholders, and prevents directors from making use of their favored
position to take advantage of shareholder interests.
'78
Courts have allowed shareholders and former shareholders of close
corporations to bring direct actions against directors for breach of fidu-
ciary duty or mismanagement of corporate assets.7 9 Courts allow a di-
bacco Coop. Stabilization Corp., 643 F. Supp. 310, 316 (D.S.C. 1986) (shareholder must
bring derivative suit).
73. H. HENN & J. ALEXANDER, LAWS OF CORPORATONS § 360, at 1049-50 (1983) (lists
wrongs that give rise to derivative actions); 2 H. O'iNEAL & R. THOSON, CLOSE CORPO-
RATIONS § 8.11, at 119-26 (3d ed. 1988). See also Ward, 295 S.C. at 221, 367 S.E.2d at 704
(derivative action lies only when the injury is not separate and distinct).
74. E.g., Johnson v. Gilbert, 127 Ariz. 410, 412, 621 P.2d 916, 918 (Ct. App. 1980);
see Kirk v. First Nat'l Bank of Columbus, 439 F. Supp. 1141, 1149 (M.D. Ga. 1977)
(when corporation can no longer recover, individual shareholder has standing to sue);
Funk v. Spalding, 74 Ariz. 219, 225-26, 246 P.2d 184, 188 (1952).
75. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-300(a)(3) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
76. REVISED MODEL BusiNsS CORP. Acr § 8.30 (1984).
77. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-300 reporters' comments (Law. Co-op. 1990).
78. Id.
79. See, e.g., Watson v. Button, 235 F.2d 235 (9th Cir. 1956) (former fifty percent
shareholder allowed to bring a direct action against other fifty percent shareholder for
fraud against the corporation, which caused decrease in value of stock); Kirk v. First
Nat'l Bank of Columbus, 439 F. Supp. 1141 (M.D. Ga. 1977) (former shareholder of close
corporation allowed to bring direct action against director for breach of fiduciary duty,
which resulted in decrease in value of stock despite possibility of multiplicity of suits by
other former shareholders); Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d
505 (1975) (minority shareholder allowed a direct action against majority shareholder
because of heightened fiduciary duty and the fundamental resemblance of a close corpo-
ration to a partnership); Miller v. Ruth's of N.C., Inc., 68 N.C. App. 40, 313 S.E.2d 849
(1984) (individual action held more appropriate than derivative action when twenty per-
cent shareholder sued eighty percent shareholder); Crosby v. Beam, 47 Ohio St. 3d 105,
548 N.E.2d 217 (1989) (former shareholder allowed to bring a direct action for breach of
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rect action in close corporations because corporate recovery in a deriv-
ative suit remains under the control of the same parties who were the
defendants in the litigation.80 Moreover, if the minority shareholders
sue the majority shareholder directors for a breach of fiduciary duty
and the corporation recovers from them, the recovery itself is a corpo-
rate asset under the control of the majority shareholder. The minority
shareholders, therefore, who brought the action may receive no benefit.
Courts also have recognized that a close corporation resembles a part-
nership and, therefore, courts apply partnership law in some
situations.""
In Davis the lower court divided the case into the following two
issues: (1) whether a shareholder could bring a direct action against a
director for breach of fiduciary duty, and (2) whether a former share-
holder could bring such an action. The court of appeals, however,
stated that no liability to shareholders for breach of fiduciary duty ex-
ists unless the breach of fiduciary duty is a failure to make a full dis-
closure of relevant facts or is an action brought by minority sharehold-
ers of a close corporation pursuant to sections 33-14-300 to -330 of the
South Carolina Code. 2 This holding is a distinct departure from the
statutory duty that the law imposes on directors to act on behalf of the
shareholders.8 3 The court of appeals also stated that "[t]he case before
us, however, does not constitute a proper vehicle to apply the princi-
ples of law involved in this burgeoning field of litigation between
shareholders in very close corporations."8 ' The court's analysis seems
flawed, however, because the corporation in Davis was a close corpora-
tion. 5 Although the plaintiff sold his stock and was no longer a share-
holder, the litigation arose out of conflicts between shareholders in a
fiduciary duty which caused devaluation of stock).
80. 2 H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 73, § 8.11, at 122 (3d ed. 1988).
81. See, e.g., Johnson v. Gilbert, 127 Ariz. 410, 412, 621 P.2d 916, 918 (Ct. App.
1980); Donahue, 367 Mass. at 586-87, 328 N.E.2d at 515.
82. Davis, 300 S.C. at 292, 387 S.E.2d at 680. Section 33-14-300 of the South Caro-
lina Code allows the shareholder to bring a proceeding only for corporate dissolution and
not for damages. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300 (Law. Co-op. 1990). The holding, therefore,
does not allow a shareholder in a close corporation to bring a direct suit for damages.
Later in the opinion, however, the court implies that minority shareholders in close cor-
porations have other remedies. Davis, 300 S.C. at 291, 387 S.E.2d at 680.
83. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-300 (Law. Co-op. 1990).
84. Davis, 300 S.C. at 288-89, 387 S.E.2d at 678.
85. Commentators generally have defined close corporations as corporations with
the following elements: (1) only a few shareholders, (2) shares not generally traded in the
securities market, and (3) all stock held by persons who are active in the management
and conduct of the business. See, e.g., 2 H. O'NEAL & R. THOmPSON, supra note 73, §
1.02, at 2-9. The corporation in Davis had only five shareholders, no generally traded
stock, and most shareholders were also officers and directors of the corporation.
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close corporation, and, therefore, the principles of close corporations
should have been applied.
In Davis several factors indicate that a denial of a direct action is
appropriate. The loss was a loss to the corporation and not a loss to an
individual shareholder separate from that of shareholders generally.
Furthermore, the defendant was not the majority shareholder s' and
was no longer in control of the corporate functions.8 7 Accordingly, the
defendant could not have controlled the corporate recovery in a deriva-
tive suit to the detriment of the other shareholders. Finally, a direct
action might subject the defendant to a multiplicity of suits and inter-
fere with the fair distribution of the recovery.
8 8
In Crosby v. Beam"9 the Ohio Supreme Court held that a former
shareholder could bring a direct action for damages for breach of fidu-
ciary duty against the controlling shareholders. The plaintiff alleged
that the three controlling shareholders, who were also directors and of-
ficers, misappropriated corporate funds by paying themselves unrea-
sonable salaries, paying their personal expenses, and using corporate
property for personal enterprises. The court recognized the distinctions
associated with close corporations and the disadvantages of derivative
suits. 0 The court emphasized the oppression by the majority share-
holders by creating a disadvantageous situation for the minority share-
holder.9 1 A comparison of Davis and Crosby reveals the following dis-
tinctions: (1) the alleged breach in Crosby was an oppressive use of the
controlling power, while in Davis no oppressive conduct existed; (2) in
Davis the plaintiff was not the only injured party; and (3) in Crosby
the defendant would be in control of any recovery in a derivative suit.
Moreover, the facts in Crosby were associated more closely with the
reasons to grant a direct action than the facts in Davis.
If the Ohio Supreme Court heard a case factually similar to Davis,
86. The record does not indicate the exact percentage of shares held by the defend-
ant, but it appears that it was less than a majority.
87. The defendant was no longer the managing officer or director. Brief of Appel-
lant at 2.
88. If the plaintiff was successful in his direct action, the other shareholders cer-
tainly would bring similar actions and argue that they were injured similarly. If the de-
fendant had become judgment proof after the first action, then the recovery would have
been unfairly distributed to the first plaintiff. The court could solve this problem by
making the plaintiff's recovery contingent upon the fair distribution to other similarly-
situated plaintiffs.
89. 47 Ohio St. 3d 105, 548 N.E.2d 217 (1989).
90. Id. at 109-10, 548 N.E.2d at 221.
91. The Ohio Supreme Court specifically held that "claims of a breach of fiduciary
duty alleged by minority shareholders against shareholders who control a majority of
shares in a close corporation, and use their control to deprive minority shareholders of
the benefits of their investment, may be brought as individual or direct actions." Id.
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it might not allow a direct action because of the limited language of the
holding, which seems to require oppressive conduct by majority share-
holders and not just a breach of fiduciary duty by a director.2 The
more important question is whether a South Carolina court would al-
low a direct action in a case factually similar to Crosby.
The first question is whether Davis restricts a shareholder from
bringing a direct action against the director. The holding in Davis indi-
cates that a director only owes a duty to the corporation for appropria-
tion of corporate assets and that a breach of this duty does not extend
to the individual shareholder. This holding, therefore, is a distinct de-
parture from the interpretation of the statute by the South Carolina
reporter.9 3 In Davis the court of appeals stated that liability to share-
holders is not present for a breach of fiduciary duty unless the officer
withheld information 94 or the minority shareholders of a close corpora-
tion brought the action pursuant to sections 33-14-300 to -330.11 This
statement appears to be overly restrictive and should not be misread.
Section 33-14-300(2)(ii) allows a shareholder to bring an action to dis-
solve the corporation if "the directors or those in control of the corpo-
ration have acted, are acting, or will act in a manner that is illegal,
fraudulent, oppressive, or unfairly prejudicial . . . ."6 Nevertheless,
sections 33-14-300 to -330 do not authorize a shareholder to bring a
direct action for damages. The shareholder arguably could recover his
share of the corporate assets upon dissolution or force a fair buy-out
settlement in this type of proceeding, 7 but dissolution may not be pre-
ferred. It appears, however, that the court leaves the door open for
future cases in which shareholders may emphasize the oppression of
minority shareholders by the majority.9
The second question is whether Davis absolutely bars a former
shareholder from bringing a direct action. The court did not overrule
the exception of Jacobson v. Yaschik99 in which a director failed to
92. See id.
93. See S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-8-300, reporters' comments (Law. Co-op. 1990).
94. Davis v. Hamm, 300 S.C. 284, 289, 387 S.E.2d 676, 679 (Ct. App. 1989).
95. See supra note 82 and accompanying text.
96. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-14-300(2)(ii) (Law. Co-op. 1990).
97. See Haynsworth, The Effectiveness of Involuntary Dissolution Suits As a
Remedy For Close Corporation Dissension, 35 CLEV. ST. L. REv. 25 (1986-87) (discussion
of available shareholder remedies).
98. The court in Davis stated, "The South Carolina statutes provide a wide range
of relief for minority stockholders .... " 300 S.C. at 786, 387 S.E.2d at 680.
99. 249 S.C. 577, 155 S.E.2d 601 (1967). This exception might be sufficiently broad
to encompass any claim in which the purchaser did not give the former shareholder full
disclosure of the facts before he sold his stock. The court's acceptance of the facts of
Watson within the exception of Jacobson indicates the court will broadly read the
exception.
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disclose relevant facts to former shareholders. Absent a Jacobson
claim, however, the holding in Davis indicates that once a shareholder
sells his stock, the shareholder has no further remedy for a director's
breach of fiduciary duty.100
Because of Davis a close corporation minority shareholder may be
trapped. The shareholder may have only the following four true alter-
natives: (1) sell the stock to mitigate damages,101 (2) keep the stock
and bring a derivative suit,102 (3) keep the stock and bring a dissolu-
tion proceeding,103 or (4) keep the stock and bring a direct action for
damages. 104 If the shareholder sells the stock, then this sale, under Da-
vis, precludes the shareholder from bringing a direct action. If the
shareholder keeps the stock, the shareholder risks further devaluation
due to other misappropriations by the majority shareholder or direc-
tors. Mitigation of damages is an established concept in most areas of
the law, and it is inequitable to penalize the minority shareholder for
trying to minimize his losses, especially upon consideration of the
questionable, if not fraudulent, actions of the benefited party.
The legal rule that no duty extends to the shareholder for misap-
propriation of corporate assets makes it clear that only a corporation
can maintain an action. The rule, however, may result in inequitable
remedies for shareholders, especially in close corporations. The corpo-
ration has a right to sue a director for misappropriation of assets, but a
former shareholder who is forced to sell his stock by the same breach
also should have this right. The court should be able to use its equita-
ble powers, such as joinder and interpleader, to allow an equitable re-
covery and distribution of the recovery. The Supreme Court of Ohio
seems to have adopted the more equitable rule which allows the former
shareholder to bring a direct action, and South Carolina courts argua-
100. In Davis the court partially distinguished Watson because no danger of multi-
plicity of suits or prejudice to another shareholders' interest existed.
101. The minority shareholder normally will have to sell his shares to another share-
holder because no other market for his stock exists. In such a case he probably will not
receive the fair market value for the stock. See Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype Co., 367
Mass. 578, 590-91, 328 N.E.2d 505, 514 (1975).
102. If the derivative suit is successful, the majority shareholders, against whom the
minority shareholders brought suit, will still be in control of the recovery because it is
part of the corporate assets. See generally 2 H. O'NEAL & R. THOMPSON, supra note 73, §
8.11, at 122.
103. This remedy might not be advantageous because the dissolution value might be
significantly lower than the true value of the corporation. The value of the corporation at
dissolution would also be significantly less after the directors have siphoned the profits
over a period of time. Therefore, a damages action also might be necessary for a true
remedy.
104. As previously discussed, this may not be an available remedy after the specific
holding in Davis.
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bly should adopt a similar rule given the specific language of the South
Carolina statute that deals with directors' duties.
Michael W. Hogue
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